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Extending the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Constitutional Mandate
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law,
without employing and consulting with an attorney.... [If he does
not fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he
apprehends may be in the least relative to the affair he consults his at-
torney upon, it will be impossiblefor the attorney properly to serve him
-Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials 1139, 1237 (1743).
The attorney-client privilege, ' the oldest of the communication privi-
leges, can be traced back to the beginnings of the common law.
2
Judges and legal commentators have addressed its scope and philo-
sophical foundation at length.3 Despite this scrutiny, elemental issues
remain unresolved as to when and how the privilege should be applied.
This comment will consider the scope of information that should be
protected by the privilege in a criminal case, with specific reference to
physical evidence and to information not directly communicated by a
defendant but nevertheless derived from a confidential communication
between the defendant and his or her attorney.
Presently, the primary categorical limitation upon the scope of the
privilege is the judicially-establishedphysical evidence exception. This
exception provides that physical evidence relevant to a criminal prose-
cution, once in the possession of the defendant's attorney, must be de-
livered by the attorney to the prosecution.' The fact that the defendant
delivered the evidence to the attorney does not bring the evidence
within the scope of the privilege. Reflecting a balance between the
1. For purposes of this discussion, the relevant definition of the attorney-client privilege is
that provided by statute: "IT]he client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer."
CAL. EVID. CODE §954. Further, a "confidential communication between client and lawyer" is
defined as "information transmitted between a client and his lawyer in the course of that relation-
ship and in confidence .... " Id §952. The scope of the "information" so protected comprises
the major focus of modem legal discussion of the privilege.
2. See qenerally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2290, at 542 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Hazard, An Historical.Perspective on theAttorney-Client Privilege,
66 CALIF. L. REv. 1061, 1069-85 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Entitlement]; Com-
ment, Attorney-Client Privilege in California, 10 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Privilege in Caifornia].
4. See note 41 infra.
5. See note 41 infra.
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need for confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship and the fact-
finding objective of the criminal justice system, the physical evidence
exception precludes a criminal defendant from concealing physical evi-
dence (that might otherwise be subject to discovery and seizure in the
course of an investigation) by delivery to his or her attorney.
The physical evidence exception addresses only one of the areas of
conflict raised by the attorney-client privilege. Certain other key issues
remain: May an attorney who discovers physical evidence take posses-
sion of the evidence? If the attorney takes possession of the evidence,
does there arise an obligation to testify as to the location of the evi-
dence? Or, may this information be denied to the prosecution, despite
the possibility that the evidence in its original location might have been
discovered in the course of the criminal investigation? Does the privi-
lege protect information derived by an attorney from a confidential
communication, when the information is not specifically contained in
the communication?7 Does the work product doctrine provide an ac-
ceptable alternative to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights, in cases in which the attorney-client privilege does not now
apply?
These issues have not been resolved by statute or by judicial deci-
sion; thus, the application of the attorney-client privilege remains sub-
ject to piecemeal interpretation. For example, in a recent California
decision involving the physical evidence exception,8 an appellate court
refused to apply the privilege to an observation by an attorney that
resulted from a confidential communication by a criminal defendant.
Employing an unprecedented standard, the court reasoned that the at-
torney's testimony was not protected by the privilege because the fact
in question was objectively observable.9 This use of "objective ob-
servability" as a criterion for application of the attorney-client privilege
would require such close distinctions to be made by the criminal de-
fendant in the course of consultation with his or her attorney as to in-
hibit unconstitutionally the defendant's exercise of the right to
counsel. 'o
Generally, the need to establish uniform standards for future appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege is indicated by the following
three factors: (1) the absence of specific statutory language addressing
the unresolved issues; (2) the absence of sufficiently specific judicial
6. See note 42 infra.
7. This consideration will be referred to infra as the derivative evidence issue.
8. People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925 (1979), ar7'd, 29 Cal. 3d 682, - P.2d . - Cal.
Rptr. - (1981) (cited here with particular reference to the appellate court opinion).
9. 98 Cal. App. 3d at 936-37.
10. See notes 61-80 and accompanying text infra.
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guidelines to prevent piecemeal interpretation of the privilege; and
(3) the legal inadequacy of the work product doctrine as an alternative
source of protection of the criminal defendant's constitutional rights
inherent in the attorney-client relationship. 1 Through analysis of the
historical use of the privilege in terms of its constitutional and public
policy purposes, this comment will identify appropriate standards for
applying the attorney-client privilege to the situations earlier described.
Two specific standards will be suggested. First, elaborating on the
physical evidence exception, upon removal of physical evidence from
its original location by defense counsel or counsel's agent, testimony as
to its location should be required under most circumstances. Second,
information not contained within a confidential communication should
nevertheless be protected by the attorney-client privilege when the in-
formation is primarily derived from a confidential communication be-
tween a criminal defendant and his or her attorney.
As a general prerequisite to the use of the attorney-client privilege,
there must be a communication in the course of the attorney-client re-
lationship, a communication intended by the client to be confidential.' 2
This comment will focus on the scope of information that may be in-
cluded within the confidentiality of the attorney-client communication.
Initially, however, the constitutional and public policy purposes of the
attorney-client privilege will be discussed, in order to identify the ra-
tionale under which the privilege should be applied.
LEGAL SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
This section will briefly assess the legal authority for the attorney-
client privilege, including a description of the physical evidence excep-
tion. Identifying the legal purposes of the attorney-client privilege,
with emphasis on its relationship to the consitutional rights of a crimi-
nal defendant, will aid in its subsequent application to the specific is-
sues referred to in the introduction.
A. Legal Basis of the Privilege
In order to determine the appropriate application of the attorney-
client privilege, it is helpful to consider first its present scope as a prod-
uct of common law, statute, and constitutional law. At its narrowest,
the privilege applies to communications by an accused criminal to his
or her counsel, in contemplation of defending a pending or imminent
11. See notes 117-130 and accompanying text infra.
12. See Sullivan v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 64, 69, 105 Cal. Rptr. 241,244 (1972); B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE Witnesses §§799, 802, 804 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
WiTKIN]; Privilege in Caif/ornia, supra note 3, at 300.
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prosecution, concerning a completed crime.' 3 Beyond this limited ap-
plication, the privilege is perhaps best viewed in each case not as a
mechanical result, but as an accommodation of competing societal and
constitutional interests.
To begin with, the attorney-client privilege arose under the common
law as one of a number of evidentiary privileges. 14 In order to limit the
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, the weight of authority
generally requires that evidentiary privileges be narrowly construed.' 5
Many cases accordingly have held that the attorney-client privilege
should be narrowly applied so as to minimize the potential for with-
holding relevant information from the fact-finding process.' 6 Case law
also, however, supports the proposition that the latitude accorded the
scope of an evidentiary privilege should be determined on a case-by-
case basis."7 Specifically, it appears that in view of the extensive statu-
tory protection of the attorney-client privilege in California,' 8 and the
constitutional considerations that underlie the privilege,' 9 the attorney-
client privilege should be categorically granted a more liberal construc-
tion than are other evidentiary privileges.20
California protects the attorney-client relationship through a combi-
nation of statutory provisions. In addition to the articulation of the
privilege in the Evidence Code, protecting "confidential communica-
tion between client and lawyer," 2' the Business and Professions Code
requires the attorney to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client."' 22 Moreover,
the Penal Code proscribes the eavesdropping or recording of a conver-
sation between "a person who is in the physical custody of a law en-
forcement officer ... and such person's attorney . ". .., These
13. HazardAn HisforicalPerspeclive on theAttorney-Client PrvIlege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061,
1062 (1978).
14. See generally WITKIN, supra note 12, §§794-937.
15. See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 396, 364 P.2d 266, 288, 15 Cal,
Rptr. 90, 112 (1961); 29 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
16. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976); People v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d
346, 354, 369 P.2d 1, 5, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (1962); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 616,
618, 335 P.2d 484,486 (1959); People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925, 937-38 (1979); Gonzales v.
Municipal Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 111, 118, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1977).
17. See Sullivan v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 64, 105 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1972).
18. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, eg., Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 509, 267 P.2d 1025, 1030 (1954), disap.
proved on other grounds, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 373 P.2d 432, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1962); People v. Atkin-
son, 40 Cal. 284, 285-86 (1870); People v. Flores, 71 Cal. App. 3d 559, 563, 139 Cal. Rptr. 546, 548
(1977); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 593, 113 Cal. Rptr.
561, 572 (1974); People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 100-01 (1954) (Shinn, J.,
concurring). See general, WITKIN, supra note 12, §795.
21. CAL. EVID. CODE §954.
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6068(e).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §636.
1982 / Attorney-Client Privilege
provisions reflect clear legislative intent that a criminal defendant be
assured of the right to consult with legal counsel without fear that the
information thereby disclosed will be used to his or her detriment.
More fundamental to the scope of the attorney-client privilege than
its legislative support are the constitutional rights the privilege is held
to protect. Although the attorney-client privilege lacks express consti-
tutional authorization, its protection of the criminal defendant's expec-
tations of confidentiality is "essentially interrelated with the specific
constitutional guaranties of the individual's right to counsel and immu-
nity from self-incrimination. ... "24 The privilege has been elsewhere
characterized as "a basic civil right, indispensable to the fulfillment of
the constitutional security against self-incrimination and the right to
make defense with the aid of counsel skilled in the law."25 Proper ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege, therefore, hinges not only
upon specific statutory language, but also upon the parameters of the
fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution.
The leading case on the relation of the attorney-client privilege to the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment is Fisher v. United
States.26 The United States Supreme Court held in Fisher that if a
defendant is privileged from producing given information, his or her
attorney may not be compelled to produce it either.27 For example, in
a New York case decided in 1975,28 an attorney was held blameless
who, upon being advised by his client of the whereabouts of a murder
victim, failed to disclose the information, in apparent violation of pub-
lic health law.2 9 Finding the attorney-client privilege to be an imple-
mentation of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination,
the court held that the privilege superseded the statutory disclosure re-
quirement on a balance of "the importance of the general privilege of
confidentiality" with the "fair administration of criminal justice." 0
As to the sixth amendment, federal case law has held that the right to
counsel is effectively and meaningfully exercised only if the defendant's
consultation with his or her attorney is private and secure from intru-
24. See State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957). See also Constitutional
Entitlement, supra note 3, at 480, 485-87, arguing the privilege to be implicitly guaranteed by the
fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution.
25. 23 N.J. at 414, 129 A.2d at 424 (1957). See also Caplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749,
757 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
26. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
27. See id at 404. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963) (applying the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination to the states under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment); Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1970); WIGMORE, supra note 2, §2307, at 592.
28. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), aft'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359
N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
29. See id 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
30. See id 372 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
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sion by the government." California's constitutional counterpart to the
sixth amendment, providing that "the defendant in a criminal cause
has the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel... ,"I has been
interpreted similarly by the California Supreme Court to assure a crim-
inal defendant the right to communicate with his or her attorney in
absolute privacy.33
The constitutional policy underlying the existence of the privilege is
self-evident: to afford a client the freedom from fear of compulsory
disclosure of information divulged in consultation with counsel 34 so
that the client will feel free to impart all relevant information essential
to effective legal counselling. 35 Any requirement that an attorney dis-
close information provided by a client would result in the client's re-
fusal to inform the attorney in order to keep incriminating facts from
the court.36 Any limitations upon the attorney-client privilege, there-
fore, should be consistent with the reasonable expectations of the client
as to the confidentiality of the consultation; otherwise, these limitations
would unduly inhibit the defendant's communications with counsel,
chilling the exercise of the defendant's constitutional rights.
The attorney-client privilege is thus integral to the constitutional
rights provided a criminal defendant under the fifth and sixth amend-
ments and should be applied accordingly. The scope of the privilege,
however, must be balanced with the fact-finding objectives of the crimi-
nal justice system, resulting in limitations upon the privilege. One such
limitation is the physical evidence exception.
B. The Physical Evidence Exception
The physical evidence exception is the primary categorical example
of a balance of the prosecutorial and constitutional implications of ap-
plying the attorney-client privilege in a given set of circumstances. The
exception was judicially created to limit the scope of the attorney-client
privilege to the constitutional and public policy concerns it was
31. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 404 (1976); Caplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Seealso Caldwell v.
United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
32. CAL. CONST. art. I, §15.
33. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 751, 598 P.2d 818, 822, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658,662
(1979); In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 941, 500 P.2d 873, 879, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849, 855 (1972). See also
In re Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 799-800, 195 P. 965, 965-66 (1920).
34. See Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 506-07, 267 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1954), disap.
provedon other grounds, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 373 P.2d 432, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1962); State v. 01well, 64
Wash. 2d 828, 832, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964). See also People v. Canfield, 12 Cal. 3d 699, 704-05,
527 P.2d 633, 637, 117 Cal. Rptr. 81, 85 (1974).
35. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); WIGMORF, supra note 2, §2291, at
545. See also Nowell v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 2d 652, 657, 36 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (1963).
36. See Privilege in California, supra note 3, at 298.
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designed to further. Under this limitation, information divulged by the
client to the attorney in the course of confidential communication may
indirectly result in providing the prosecution with additional physical
evidence to prove the guilt of the criminal defendant. 7 This may occur
when the attorney, either directly or through an investigating agent,
takes possession of physical evidence in the course of factual investiga-
tion performed in preparing the defense. In the leading California case
on this limitation, People v. Lee,38 the court held that the importance of
an attorney's obligations under the privilege of attorney-client confi-
dentiality39 was outweighed on a balance of policy considerations, in
that standards of professional responsibility did not allow an attorney
"knowingly to take possession of and secrete the instrumentalities of a
crime." 40 Accordingly, the court required that the attorney turn over to
the prosecution any physical evidence in his or her possession relevant
to the criminal case,4' on the basis that an attorney may not serve as a
depository for evidence of a crime and may not act to suppress such
evidence.42
This exception has been carefully defined by the courts. In Lee, the
court held that an attorney is entitled to withhold the evidence for a
reasonable period of time, for the purposes of collecting information
and preparing a defense.43 Additionally, although the physical object
itself is not protected by the privilege, the fact that the defendant deliv-
ered the evidence to the attorney must be treated as privileged
information.'
Furthermore, physical evidence protected by the defendant's fifth
amendment right because of its testimonial nature falls outside of this
exception to the attorney-client privilege when delivered by the defend-
ant to the attorney.45 For example, an early case on the interpretation
37. See notes 41, 42 and accompanying text infra.
38. 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1970).
39. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).
40. 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722 (1970).
41. See 3 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722. See generally In re January 1976 Grand
Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 720 (7th Cir. 1976); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210 (Alas. 1978); State v.
Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833-34, 394 P.2d 681, 684-85 (1964); Graffeo, Ethics, Law, and Loyalty:
The Attorney's Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 StAN. L. REV. 977 (1980);
Sevilla, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Ethical Perils of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 2 NAT'L
J. OF CRIM. DEF. 237, 263-65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Scylla & Charybdis].
42. See State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 710,471 P.2d 553, 565 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942
(1971).
43. See 3 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722. See also 64 Wash. 2d at 833-34, 394 P.2d
at 684-85.
44. See People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722 (1970); Anderson v.
State, 297 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. App. 1974); State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 834, 394 P.2d 681,
684 (1964); WIGMORE, supra note 2, §2264, at 379. See generally Comment, The Right of a Crimi-
nal Defense Attorney to Withhold Physical Evidence Receivedfrom His Client, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
211 (1970). Cf. State v. Vindhurst, 63 Wash. 2d 607, 614-16, 388 P.2d 552, 556-57 (1964).
45. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 413-14 (1976); In re January 1976 Grand Jury,
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of the attorney-client privilege held that an attorney may not be com-
pelled to disclose the existence or location of physical evidence if the
attorney observed the evidence as the direct result of a communication
from his or her client.46 Information of this sort constitutes testimonial
evidence that the prosecution could not compel the defendant to dis-
close under the fifth amendment; thus, the defendant's attorney should
be precluded from testifying about this information.47 Any other result
would present the criminal defendant with the dilemma of exercising
either the right to counsel or the right against self-incrimination, but
not both. Application of the attorney-client privilege is, therefore, nec-
essary to avoid unduly inhibiting the criminal defendant in the exercise
of his or her constitutional rights.
The attorney-client privilege and the physical evidence exception
demonstrate legislative and judicial concern with a balance of the pub-
lic policy factors affected by the privilege, centering upon a tension be-
tween the consideration by the court of all relevant evidence48 and the
protection of a criminal defendant in the exercise of constitutional
rights.49 Fundamentally, the attorney-client privilege exists to allow
the defendant to provide information to an attorney50 pursuant to pre-
paration of an effective legal defense,5 without fear that the exercise of
the right to counsel will provide the attorney with information with
which the defendant will be incriminated at trial.5 2 This interpretation
has been supported without apparent exception in judicial decisions
and legal commentaries addressing the relationship between the fifth
and sixth amendments and the attorney-client privilege.53
The physical evidence exception, for example, serves to limit the
scope of the privilege to its constitutional purposes by requiring the
attorney to provide physical evidence that: (1) would not, in the de-
fendant's possession, be protected by the fifth amendment right against
534 F.2d 719, 724 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976); Comment, The Problem of an Attorney in Possession of
Evidence Incriminating His Client: The Need For a Predictable Standard, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 43 1,
439 (1978). See generally WiTKrN, supra note 12, §811 (Supp. 1977). For example, a written
statement prepared by the client in the course of consultation with an attorney would be protected
by the fifth amendment and by the attorney-client privilege; documents preexisting the criminal
prosecution, however, would not be testimonial in nature, and would not therefore be protected by
the privilege when delivered to the attorney.
46. See State v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 770, 780 (1882); Comment, The Problem of an Attorney in
Possession ofEvidence Incriminating His Client: The Need For a Predictable Standard, 47 U. CIN,.
L. REv. 431, 438 (1978); Scylla & Charybdis, supra note 41 at 264.
47. See People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 190, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 802 (1975).
48. See note 14 supra.
49. See notes 34, 35 supra.
50. See note 35 supra.
51. See note 25 supra.
52. See note 34 supra.
53. See notes 24-34 supra.
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self-incrimination,54 and (2) has come into the actual possession of the
attorney.5 The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
not infringed upon by the physical evidence exception, which concerns
only evidence not protected by the fifth amendment.5 ' Furthermore,
the sixth amendment right to counsel, and its counterpart in the Cali-
fornia Constitution,5 7 are not disturbed, as there is no authority for the
proposition that the constitutional right to legal counsel includes the
right of defense counsel to take possession of physical evidence without
restriction. 58 Balanced against the interests of society in permitting a
criminal investigation to produce evidence not protected by the fifth
amendment privilege,59 the purposes of defense preparation served by
defense counsel's actual removal and possession of physical evidence
cannot reasonably be entitled to unqualified constitutional protection.
Thus, no serious questions of constitutionality appear to be raised by a
judicial doctrine requiring physical evidence of a non-testimonial na-
ture that has come into the possession of defense counsel to be trans-
ferred to the prosecution.
To summarize, the attorney-client privilege, as generally codified, in-
terpreted, and applied, is consistent with constitutional law and public
policy concerns. The argument for an articulated standard of applica-
tion of the privilege is founded on the danger that, as demonstrated by
recent California case law,60 the failure to consider adequately the pol-
icy factors underlying the privilege may lead to applications inconsis-
tent with its rationale.
THE PROBLEM-APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
One example of the potential for misapplication of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege arose in the appellate court decision in People v. Mere-
dith,6" involving an application of the physical evidence exception.
The case centered upon physical evidence procured by an attorney's
54. See note 46 supra.
55. See Scylla & Charybdis, supra note 41, at 263-64.
56. See note 46 supra.
57. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §15. The constitutional right to counsel of a criminal defendant
includes a right to legal representation that can be fairly characterized as competent, see McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), and a right to pretrial preparation of a defense on
the basis of an independent examination by counsel of facts, circumstances, pleadings, and appli-
cable law. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412,
423, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979); In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1041-42, 472
P.2d 921, 926, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1970); In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 175, 460 P.2d 984, 988-
89, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784, 788-89 (1969). See generally Zeitlan, The Constitutional Mandate of Effective
Assistance of Counsel- The Duty to Investigate, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1977).
58. See note 41 supra.
59. See note 16 supra.
60. See People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925 (1979).
61. 98 Cal. App. 3d 925 (1979).
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investigator 62 pursuant to information conveyed by a criminal defend-
ant in a confidential communication with the attorney.63 The trial
court compelled the agent to testify as to the location of the evidence. 4
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that:
(1) the courts have refused to apply the attorney-client privilege to in-
formation coming to an attorney from an independent source; 65 and
(2) because observations of fact made by experts are deemed an in-
dependent source, and therefore admissible, 66 the observation of physi-
cal evidence in its original location is admissible as well.67 The court
reasoned,
Scott (the defendant) now contends that since [the attorney's agent]
observed the location as a result of the communication from Scott to
[his attorney], the location as well as the communication may not be
disclosed. This contention is unacceptable. The location of the
[physical evidence] did not become privileged merely because Scott
told it to [his attorney].6"
Mistakenly perceiving the expert testimony cases to hinge on the ob-
jective observability of the information sought to be admitted,69 the ap-
pellate court in Meredith reasoned that any objective observation was
independent, and therefore outside the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. The court thereby created a standard for interpretation of
the privilege that bears no relation to its legal rationale.70 The expert
testimony limitation relied on by the court, accurately interpreted, is
based on the fact that the attorney-client privilege is correctly applied
only to protect communications between client and attorney,7 1 not
knowledge coming to the attorney from an independent source, such as
an expert's specialized knowledge.72 For example, the California
62. References in this comment to the attorney taking possession of physical evidence should
be deemed to cover also the situation in which the attorney's agent takes possession, since the two
situations are indistinguishable as to the application of the attorney-client privilege. See Gonzales
v. Municipal Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 111, 118, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1977); CAL. EvID. CODE
§952.
63. See 98 Cal. App. 3d at 935.
64. See id at 934-38.
65. See id at 936 (illustrating the independent source limitation by reference to cases involv-
ing expert testimony).
66. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
67. See 98 Cal. App. 3d at 936-37.
68. Id at 937.
69. See note 72 infra.
70. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text infra.
71. See Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 377 (1859). See generally Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d
1200 (Alas. 1978); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942
(1971); Privilege in Calfornia, supra note 3, at 305.
72. See Privilege in Caiffornia, supra note 3, at 316-17. The admissibility of expert testimony
is predicated on the subject matter of the testimony being sufficiently removed from common
experience that the trier of fact will benefit from the assistance of a specialist. See G. LILLY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 391 (1978); 2 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §§559-560, at
640 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
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Supreme Court in Oceanside Union School District v. Superior Court73
held that factual data and opinions gathered by an expert were not
privileged. The court reasoned that the information "did not emanate
from the client,"74 but rather had been derived from the specialized
knowledge and analysis of the expert." Under the facts of Meredith,
the observations of the investigator employed by Scott's attorney in-
volved no independent knowledge on the investigator's part. His testi-
mony served only to confirm information directly provided by
defendant Scott, and to this extent should have been excluded under
the attorney-client privilege.76 Meredith is distinguishable from the ex-
pert witness cases, in that the witness in Meredith was called to testify
about information he received from the confidential communication
between client and attorney, not about information arising from his
independent expertise.77
Beyond the error in reasoning committed by the appellate court in
Meredith, the apparently categorical exclusion by the court of observed
facts from the attorney-client privilege raises a serious constitutional
issue. The constitutional right to counsel78 entitles a criminal defend-
ant to rely upon counsel to conduct an independent investigation. 79 A
standard that could compel counsel to testify to the observation of facts
drawn from client communications infringes upon the assurance of
confidentiality and privacy of communication with counsel guaranteed
to a criminal defendant under the constitutional right to counsel. 0 By
penalizing the criminal defendant for exercising the right to counsel,
the Meredith standard permits the defendant to employ either the right
to counsel or the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
but precludes the use of both.
A legitimate ground to support the introduction of the investigator's
testimony in Meredith was cited only incidentally by the appellate
court when it pointed out that, once the agent removed the physical
evidence from its original location, the agent's testimony became the
only potential source available to the prosecution of evidence concern-
73. 58 Cal. 2d 180, 373 P.2d 439, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1962).
74. Id at 191, 373 P.2d at 446, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 382. See also San Diego Professional Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 201, 373 P.2d 448, 452, 23 Cal. Rptr. 384, 388 (1962).
75. See Privilege in California, supra note 3, at 316-17.
76. See People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, 509-10, 531 P.2d 793, 799, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231
(1975), holding that "confidentiality is not destroyed by disclosure of confidential communications
to third persons 'to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for. . . the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the lawyer is consulted."' See also Privilege in California, supra note 3, at 304.
77. Compare Scylla & Charybdis, supra note 41, at 264, with Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.
2d 210, 219-20, 373 P.2d 457, 461-62, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393, 397-98 (1962).
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONsT. art. I, §15.
79. See note 16 supra.
80. See notes 31, 33 supra. See also Petition for Hearing at 12-26, People v. Meredith, 98 Cal.
App. 3d 925 (1979) (copy on file at the Pacbfc Law Journal).
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ing that location."' The interference of defense counsel with the poten-
tial course of a fact-finding investigation was, in fact, the basis upon
which the Meredith result was subsequently affirmed by the California
Supreme Court.82 This policy concern, which subsequently will be dis-
cussed in greater depth, offers a more feasible basis for limitation of the
attorney-client privilege than does the standard articulated by the ap-
pellate court in Meredith. The implication of the court that the client
must discern, in communications with his or her attorney, between "ob-
jectively observable" facts and other information in order to rely upon
the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is contrary to the
client's reasonable expectations of confidentiality, thus rendering
meaningless the constitutional right to counsel.
8 3
IDENTIFICATION OF A STANDARD OF APPLICATION
The constitutional interests protected by the attorney-client privilege
dictate that more definitive standards be established. Specifically,
guidelines must be created for the consistent treatment of physical
evidence and of information derived from, but not explicitly contained
in, confidential communications between attorney and client.
A. The Treatment of Physical Evidence
The physical evidence exception reflects a balance of the public pol-
icy and constitutional factors underlying the attorney-client privilege84
and, therefore, appears to stand on firm judicial footing.85 The Mere-
dith fact situation, however, raises issues beyond the scope of the physi-
cal evidence exception, in that once defense counsel takes possession of
physical evidence related to a criminal offense, the prosecution is pre-
cluded from subsequent discovery of the evidence in its original loca-
tion. This potential interference with the judicial fact-finding process
must be weighed against the likelihood that the exercise of constitu-
tional liberties will be impaired. Specifically, this balancing process
must address: (1) the importance of the actual removal of physical evi-
dence by a defense attorney, or an agent of the attorney, to the defend-
ant's exercise of the right to counsel, as it furthers a duty of
investigation on the attorney's part; 6 and (2) the possibility that the
prosecution might discover the evidence were it left in its original loca-
81. People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925, 938 (1979).
82. See People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, - P.2d - - Cal. Rptr. - (1981).
83. See Petition for Hearing at 26, People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925 (1979) (copy on
file at the Pacpfc Law Journal).
84. See notes 24, 31 supra.
85. See note 41 supra.
86. See note 57 supra.
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tion, thereby obtaining information as to its location as well. 87
Strictly on a public policy balance, strong arguments may be offered
both for and against compelling defense counsel to testify about where
the physical evidence was found. On the one hand, the unrestrained
removal and possession of physical evidence allows for a more compre-
hensive analysis of the evidence and, thereby, better representation of
the defendant. The concern that this could result in frustrating the ju-
dicial fact-finding process is substantially mitigated by the fact that the
defendant is not legally constrained from personally delivering physical
evidence to an attorney. Should the defendant do so, the information
as to the original location of the evidence is lost to the prosecution be-
cause the attorney has observed no fact upon which he or she could be
compelled to testify, and the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
would preclude the prosecution from compelling testimony as to the
defendant's observations.
On the other hand, the Attorney General has argued that the loca-
tion of physical evidence is ordinarily at least as important to the ascer-
tainment of truth as the physical evidence itself because its exculpatory
potential is "inseparably attached to the evidence." 8 Additionally, it
should be noted that, while the fifth amendment may bar the defend-
ant's testimony pursuant to his or her removal of physical evidence, the
defendant's attorney is not in a similar position. As an officer of the
court, defense counsel should not be permitted to interfere indiscrimi-
nately with a criminal investigation.
Basic to the resolution of these conflicting arguments is an assess-
ment of the constitutional principles involved, beginning with the prop-
osition that an evidentiary privilege should not be subject to limitation
on public policy grounds to the extent that its application is necessary
to protect the exercise of a constitutional right.8 9 The attorney-client
privilege should not, therefore, be limited, to the extent that its applica-
tion is necessary to protect fifth and sixth amendment rights. Accord-
ingly, the physical evidence exception to the attorney-client privilege
should not be applied when it would infringe upon the constitutional
right to counsel. The physical evidence exception is thus dependent
upon the judicial determination that the right to counsel does not pro-
tect the attorney's unqualified possession of physical evidence.
Case law interpreting the right to counsel supports this view. As a
87. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 15, People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925 (1979) (filed
by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice) (copy on fie at the Pacfic Law Journal); see notes
46, 47 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Response to Petition for Hearing at 13, People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925
(1979) (copy on file at the Pac#fc Law Journal).
89. See Constitutional Entitlement, supra note 3, at 480, 485-87.
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constitutional privilege, the right to counsel requires that counsel be
competent9" and that counsel, in preparing a legal defense for the ac-
cused, conduct an independent investigation of the facts, circum-
stances, pleadings, and applicable law.91 Thus, judicial decisions
applying the physical evidence exception have held that defense coun-
sel may retain possession of the physical evidence temporarily for the
purposes of collecting information and preparing a defense.92 These
decisions support the conclusion that the physical evidence exception is
constitutional to the extent that it avoids infringing upon the constitu-
tional right to counsel.
The right of temporary custody for analysis of physical evidence may
be inferred, therefore, to arise from the constitutional right to counsel.
Accordingly, the accused is constitutionally entitled to the possession of
relevant physical evidence by his or her attorney to the extent that such
possession is essential to the attorney's fact-finding investigation, pur-
suant to the preparation of a legal defense.93 After a reasonable period
of time, the attorney must relinquish the physical evidence to the prose-
cution;94 this limitation is constitutionally acceptable because perma-
nent possession cannot reasonably be said to be necessary for the
preparation of an adequate legal defense. Once analysis is complete,
the constitutional interest of the criminal defendant ceases to apply,
and policy interests in the judicial fact-finding process dictate that the
evidence be relinquished.95
When the preparation of an adequate legal defense requires that evi-
dence be taken into possession by the attorney, a requirement that the
attorney testify as to the location of the evidence is unconstitutional
under the fifth and sixth amendments. This compulsion to testify, ap-
plicable only when physical evidence is taken into possession by the
attorney,96 thereby penalizes the accused. When temporary possession
of the evidence by the attorney comprises an exercise of the defendant's
right to counsel,97 the requirement that the attorney testify about the
location of the evidence is an infringement of that constitutional right,
rendering moot the public policy considerations in support of the com-
pulsion.98 Therefore, when the defendant's constitutional right to
counsel requires that the attorney take possession of physical evidence,
90. See note 57 supra.
91. See note 57 supra.
92. See notes 43-44 and accomanying text supra.
93. See notes 43-44, 57 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying note 92 supra.
94. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 41 supra.
96. See Scylla & Charybdis, supra note 41, at 263-64. See note 45 supra.
97. See notes 43-44, 57 and accompanying text supra; text accompaying note 92 supra.
98. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
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the attorney may not constitutionally be compelled to testify as to the
location where the evidence was found.
When the attorney's possession of physical evidence is not necessary
to the defendant's exercise of the constitutional right to counsel,99
whether defense counsel should be compelled to testify about the loca-
tion of evidence removed by the attorney should be resolved by a bal-
ance of relevant public policy factors.1' ° Paramount among these
factors is that the defendant should not be permitted to employ legal
counsel as a means of hiding incriminating physical evidence that
might otherwise be subject to discovery by the prosecution.101 Further-
more, defense counsel should not be permitted to take possession of
physical evidence indiscriminately, thereby depriving the prosecution
of information concerning its location.'0 2 Therefore, if defense counsel
is able to demonstrate to the court that the physical evidence in ques-
tion would not have come to the attention of the prosecution in the
course of an unhindered investigation, no grounds would remain for
the requirement that the attorney testify about the location where the
evidence was found. Any use of incriminating evidence resulting from
the confidential communication of information between attorney and
client comprises a limitation upon the free exercise of the right to coun-
sel. Even when an evidentiary use of the information is not integral to
that constitutional protection, any restriction upon the client's reason-
able expectations of confidentiality should be subject to a requirement
of justification on the basis of a greater public policy purpose. 0 3 Thus,
when defense counsel can show that taking possession of certain physi-
cal evidence did not interfere with a law enforcement investigation, by
showing that the evidence would not have been discovered in the
course of the investigation, no justification remains for using testimony
as to the location of the physical evidence against the defendant.
The objective in establishing specific standards for application of the
attorney-client privilege is to protect legitimate expectations of confi-
dentiality in the criminal defendant's exercise of the constitutional right
to counsel without creating an incentive for defense counsel to interfere
actively with the ability of the prosecution to discover relevant facts
99. That is, when meaningful analysis of the evidence may be accomplished without taking
possession of the physical evidence. Cf. Scylla & Charybdir, supra note 41, at 263-64. Compare
notes 43-45, 57 and accompanying text supra.
100. See ConstitutionalEntitlement, supra note 3, at 480, 485-87.
101. See State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 710,471 P.2d 553, 565 (1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 942
(1971).
102. See Reply to Brief of Amicus Curiae at 18-20, People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925
(1979) (filed by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice) (copy on fie at the Fdcjfc Law
Journal).
103. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
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through its investigatory function. This objective would seemingly best
be accomplished by the requirement that, upon removal of physical
evidence by defense counsel or counsel's agent, testimony as to its loca-
tion would be compelled absent a showing by the defense counsel that
either: (1) removal of the evidence for analysis was integral to coun-
sel's ascertainment of facts for preparation of a legal defense, and
thereby protected by the constitutional right to counsel; 1°4 or (2) re-
gardless of the actions of defense counsel, the evidence would not have
come to the attention of the authorities in the course of their investiga-
tion. The first exception is necessary to protect the basic constitutional
right of the defendant to have legal representation by counsel suffi-
ciently informed to prepare and present a competent defense. 105 As to
the second exception, if the prosecution would not have discovered the
information on its own, no legitimate judicial purpose is served by
compelling the defendant's attorney to augment actively the case
against his or her client. 106 Placing the burden of establishing one of
these two factors upon the defense is necessary to prevent defense
counsel from indiscriminately interfering with the fact-finding process.
The alternative of requiring the prosecution to show both that the re-
moval of evidence was not necessary to the protection of defendant's
constitutional rights and that the evidence would probably have been
found in its original location seems, on balance, to place an undue bur-
den on the prosecution of crimes. 1
0 7
B. Derivative Evidence and the Work Product Doctrine
An additional issue that hinges upon the policy foundation of the
attorney-client privilege is the application of the privilege to informa-
tion that, while not directly contained in communications between cli-
ent and attorney, is made available to the attorney in the course of
investigation based on confidential communications from the client.
This indirect evidence, while partially protected by the attorney's work
product privilege, 1°8 must also be considered under the attorney-client
privilege held by the criminal defendant, thus incorporating the protec-
tion of the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights.
Although derivative information is not expressly protected by the
statutory codification of the privilege-that refers to "confidential com-
104. See note 57 supra.
105. See Constitutional Entitlement, supra note 3, at 480, 485-87. See notes 43-44, 57 and ac-
companying text supra; text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
106. See ConstitutionalEntitlement, supra note 3, at 480, 485-87. See notes 34-36, 101-102 and
accompan text supra.
107. See People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, - P.2d , - Cal. Rptr. - (1981).
108. See text accompanying notes 117-130 infra.
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munications" between attorney and client,10 9 this information falls
within the scope of the constitutional right to counsel as the right has
been interpreted to provide the criminal defendant with the assurance
of consultation with a legal representative without fear of self-incrimi-
nation.10 A client would not expect that information given to his or
her attorney, pursuant to the attorney's preparation of a legal defense,
would serve as a basis for the discovery of incriminating evidence to
which counsel could be compelled to testify. Accordingly, information
primarily derived from a confidential communication should be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.
As the expert testimony cases illustrate, the attorney-client privilege
does not protect information held by the attorney that did not emanate
from the client."' Since the primary source of expert testimony is the
specialized knowledge and analysis of the expert, rather than raw fac-
tual data provided by client communications, courts frequently have
held the conclusions of the expert to be outside the scope of the privi-
lege.1 2 The exclusion of an expert report from the privilege occurs,
however, only when "the information on which it is predicated cannot
be shown to have emanated from that attorney's client.""' 3 Alterna-
tively, "if the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation of the
agency indicate that the agent was retained to evaluate and pass on to
the attorney matters which emanate in confidence from the client, both
his opinions and his report are clothed with the privilege.""' 4
In determining whether given testimony is protected by the attorney-
client privilege, the Oceanside criterion is that the "distinction is based
on the source of the expert's information . . 15 The weight of case
law supports the proposition that factual determinations and opinions
drawn by an expert retained by counsel are covered by the attorney-
client privilege to the extent that they are drawn from the confidential
communications of client and attorney.1 6 This standard serves to deny
109. See CAL. EvID. CODE §952.
110. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
111. See notes 71, 74 supra.
112. See People ex rel Dep't of Public Works v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 354-55, 369 P.2d 1,
5, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (1962).
113. Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 188, 373 P.2d 439, 444,
23 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1962).
114. San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 202, 373 P.2d 448, 452,
23 Cal. Rptr. 384, 388 (1962). For example, an expert's opinion is protected by the attorney-client
privilege when it constitutes a scientific or technical evaluation of information emanating from the
client. See id at 188, 373 P.2d at 444, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
115. Id at 189, 373 P.2d at 445, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
116. See Petition for Hearing at 26, People v. Meredith, 98 Cal. App. 3d 925 (1979) (copy on
file at the Pacfc Law Journal). See, e.g., San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.
2d 194, 373 P.2d 448, 23 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1962) (holding unprivileged an engineer's report on
physical and structural qualities of a building, as well as a real estate appraiser's report); City and
County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) (holding privileged
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application of the privilege, then, only to evidence drawn from sources
other than the client. As a result, the reasonable'expectations of confi-
dentiality held by the client are protected, permitting the free exercise
of the constitutional right to counsel without the fear of self-
incrimination.
In recognizing this distinction, it should be noted that the application
of the attorney-client privilege to derivative evidence does not merely
duplicate the scope of the work product doctrine. While the work
product doctrine protects certain information also protected by the at-
torney-client privilege, it encompasses applications and purposes dis-
tinct from those of the attorney-client privilege"' and is thus
inadequate to protect the constitutional interests represented by the
privilege. This distinction is most evident in a comparison of the policy
purposes and standards of application pertaining to the two forms of
evidentiary privilege.
The public policy furthered by the work product doctrine is cited in
the Code of Civil Procedure as follows: "It is the policy of this state
(i) to preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that
degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases
thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavora-
ble aspects of such cases and (ii) to prevent an attorney from taking
undue advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts."' ' 8 The work
product doctrine is thus oriented toward maintaining the practical pro-
tections inherent to the smooth functioning of the adversary system of
fact-finding. 1 9 As important as this purpose may be, it invokes a lesser
degree of legal protection than do the constitutional rights inherent to
the attorney-client privilege. 2 °
The work product doctrine is deemed an absolute privilege when ap-
plied to "any writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal research or theories. . . 11" Any other
evidence obtained through the efforts of the attorney is protected from
a physician's examination of a client at the request of the latter's attorney). The latter case addi-
tionally held that a communication "by anyform of agency employed or set in motion by the client
is within the privilege." Id at 237, 231 P.2d at 31 (emphasis in original).
117. See, e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 593-94,
113 Cal.Rptr. 561, 572-73 (1974). See generally Bergman, Status of the Work Product Doctrine in
California, 6 Sw. L. REv. 677 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Work Product Doctrine].
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(g).
119. See, e.g., 38 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 573 (holding that the work product
doctrine is primarily designed to satisfy the privacy requirement of the attorney, rather than the
client); Southern Pac. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 195, 198, 83 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (1969);
Brown v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 430, 437, 32 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (1963). See generally
WITKUN,supra note 12, §§817-820 (Supp. 1977); Work Product Doctrine, supra note 117, at 683-85.
120. See generally Constitutional Entitlement, supra note 3, at 480.
121. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §2016(b). Seealso People v. Moore, 50 Cal. App. 3d 989, 994, 123
Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (1975).
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discovery only to the extent that denial of discovery does not, in the
judgment of the court, "unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery
in preparing his claim or defense or. .. result in an injustice. .. ..
The claim of "work product" has been elsewhere interpreted to com-
prise not "an absolute bar to discovery," but only "a circumstance to be
considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion."'
23
The 1962 decision of the California Supreme Court in Suezaki v. Su-
perior Court 2n is illustrative of the contrast between the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine. Addressing the right of dis-
covery concerning certain photographic evidence obtained by an inves-
tigator employed by one of the attorneys, 125 the court found, upon a
consideration of equity and justice, that the films might be protected
under the work product doctrine. 126 In refusing to apply the attorney-
client privilege, however, the court held that the evidence in question
did not emanate from the client, on the basis that the films were not "a
graphic representation of the defendants, their activities, their mental
impressions, anything within their knowledge, or of anything owned by
them."' 127 The case demonstrates that the work product doctrine, pri-
marily oriented toward the privacy interests of the attorney, 128 and the
attorney-client privilege, designed to protect the interests of the client,
are not equivalent in scope. In light of the policy interests represented
by the work product doctrine 129 and its lack of constitutional protec-
tion, the purposes of the attorney-client privilege can be adequately
safeguarded only by an application of the privilege that is grounded in
the nature of those purposes. 130 The constitutional interests of the right
to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination, as they are im-
plicated in the capacity of a criminal defendant to consult freely with
his or her attorney, require the protection of an absolute evidentiary
privilege; the attorney-client privilege must be applied so as to provide
that protection.
122. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(b). See also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.
2d 355, 401, 364 P.2d 266, 291, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 115 (1961); Mack v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App.
2d 7, 11, 66 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1968); Work Product Doctrine, supra note 117, at 692-95.
123. Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 192, 373 P.2d 439, 446,
23 Cal. Rptr. 375, 382 (1962); see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947); San Diego
Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 204, 373 P.2d 448, 454, 23 Cal. Rptr. 384, 390
(1962); Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 178, 373 P.2d 432, 438-39, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368,
374-75 (1962).
124. 58 Cal. 2d 166, 373 P.2d 432, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1962).
125. Id at 176-77, 373 P.2d at 437-38, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
126. See id at 177-78, 373 P.2d at 438-39, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
127. Id at 177, 373 P.2d at 438, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
128. See note 119 supra.
129. See notes 118, 119 supra.
130. See notes 121-123 supra.
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CONCLUSION
To apply the attorney-client privilege with consistency to a wide va-
riety of fact patterns, it is essential in each case to balance the judicial
objective of the ascertainment of truth with the policy purposes of the
privilege, with emphasis on the role of the attorney-client privilege in
protecting the constitutional right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination. For these constitutional guarantees to be ade-
quately protected, the evidentiary privilege of attorney-client confiden-
tiality must be applied to assure a criminal defendant that self-
incrimination will not result from the free discussion with his or her
attorney of facts necessary to prepare a legal defense.1
3 1
Accordingly, the client's reasonable expectations of confidentiality in
consultation with counsel must be appropriately safeguarded. This
protection must be more clearly established in two particular areas.
First, as to the removal of physical evidence, the ability of the govern-
ment to conduct a criminal investigation without active interference by
defense counsel must be limited by the constitutional right of the crimi-
nal defendant to counsel,'3 2 including consultation without fear of self-
incrimination 3 3 and the preparation by counsel of a defense based
upon an independent investigation of the facts.' 34 This is accomplished
to some degree by the current physical evidence exception, requiring
defense counsel to transfer to the prosecution physical evidence in his
or her possession.'3 5 Additionally, however, the attorney or agent
should be compelled to testify as to the location where the evidence was
found, absent a showing of one of two exceptional cases: (1) that re-
moval of the evidence for analysis was integral to counsel's ascertain-
ment of facts for preparation of a legal defense, and therefore protected
by the sixth amendment right of the defendant to counsel; or (2) re-
gardless of the actions of defense counsel, the evidence would not have
come to the attention of the prosecution in the course of its investiga-
tion. This testimony, of course, would have to be presented in such a
manner as to preclude the inference that the defendant was the source
of the information.'3 6 Second, evidence that is prmarily derived from
confidential communications between client and attorney, rather than
from an independent source, must be deemed within the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. 137 Although this principle has been articu-
131. See notes 26, 27 supra.
132. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 57 supra.
135. See note 40 supra.
136. See note 43 supra.
137. See, e.g., Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 188, 373 P.2d
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lated in California case law since at least 1859,138 the reference of the
statutory statement of the privilege simply to "communications"' 39 be-
tween client and attorney is not sufficiently definitive on this point.
While the courts have been the source of most of the doctrine rele-
vant to the attorney-client privilege, the lack of specific standards for its
application permits considerable inconsistency in the interpretation of
the privilege. In view of the significance of the constitutional purposes
served by the attorney-client privilege, the legislative implementation
of standards similar to those suggested above would better protect the
privilege and the constitutional interests it serves. While the courts
would retain substantial responsibilty for interpretation, the greater ju-
dicial consistency achieved through the use of legislative guidelines
would offer an improved degree of protection to the constitutional
rights inherent in the application of the privilege.
Jeffrey A. DeLand
439, 444, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1962); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. 2d 227, 236-37, 231 P.2d 26, 30-31 (1951).
138. See Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363 (1859).
139. See CAL. EVID. CODE §954.
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